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To study rapid sensorimotor remapping, we devel-
oped a method to train rats in a behavior in which
subjects are cued, on each trial, to apply a sensori-
motor association to orient either toward a visual
target (‘‘Pro’’) or away from it, toward its reverse
(‘‘Anti’’). Multiple behavioral asymmetries suggested
that Anti behavior is cognitively demanding while Pro
is easier to learn and perform. This is consistent with
a prominent hypothesis in the primate literature that
Anti requires prefrontal cortex (PFC), whereas Pro
could be mediated by midbrain superior colliculus
(SC). Pharmacological inactivation of rat medial
PFC supported its expected role in Anti. Remarkably,
bilateral SC inactivation substantially impaired Anti
while leaving Pro essentially intact. Moreover, SC
inactivation eliminated the performance cost of
switching from Anti to Pro tasks. Our results estab-
lish a rodent model of single-trial sensorimotor re-
mapping and suggest a critical role for SC in the
cognitively demanding Anti task.
INTRODUCTION
Rapid sensorimotor remapping in response to changing environ-
mental demands on the timescale of seconds or less is a remark-
able cognitive ability and a hallmark of executive control. It is,
perhaps, most acutely probed when the sensorimotor associa-
tions that subjects switch between are direct reversals of each
other. This is the casewith thepro/antisaccadeparadigm (Hallett,
1978),whichhasbeenusedextensively to study the neuralmech-
anisms underlying response inhibition and flexible control of
behavior inprimates (MunozandEverling, 2004). In thisparadigm,
subjects apply one of two sensorimotor associations, each the
reverse of the other: in the ‘‘Pro’’ task, subjects should associate
a peripheral visual target with orienting toward it; in the ‘‘Anti’’
task, subjects should associate the visual target with orienting
away from it. Switching between the two sensorimotor associa-
tions can be very rapid, from one seconds-long trial to the next.Performance in pro/antisaccade task switching is a sensitive
tool for assessing cognitive impairments in various psychiatric
disorders (Everling and Fischer, 1998; Hutton andEttinger, 2006).
Despite a rich rodent literature in flexible control of behavior
(Durstewitz et al., 2010; Floresco et al., 2008; Jaramillo et al.,
2014; Karlsson et al., 2012; Kimchi and Laubach, 2009; Rich
and Shapiro, 2009; Rodgers and DeWeese, 2014), response
conflict (Haddon et al., 2008; Oualian and Gisquet-Verrier,
2010), and rapid switching between fixed sensorimotor associa-
tions (Baker and Ragozzino, 2014; Leenaars et al., 2012), reports
of cued, rapid remapping of the association between sensory
stimuli and motor responses, occurring on the order of hundreds
ofmilliseconds to seconds, are rare in rodents (e.g., Fassihi et al.,
2014). However, such rapidity in sensorimotor remapping, indic-
ative of the speed and flexibility withwhich information can be re-
routed within the brain, is one of the most remarkable features of
adaptive behavior. Some particularly notable features of execu-
tive control are best isolated when associations are switched
from one trial to the next. For example, cueing subjects before
each trial with the identity of the association to be used mini-
mizes confusion as to which sensorimotor association they
should apply; yet even when very clearly cued, humans are
slower and/or more error prone on the first trial immediately
following a sensorimotor association change than on repetition
trials of the same task. This first-trial effect is known as the
‘‘switch cost’’ (Allport et al., 1994; Baker and Ragozzino, 2014;
Cherkasova et al., 2002; Leenaars et al., 2012; Rogers and Mon-
sell, 1995; Weiler and Heath, 2012), and its underlying cause is
the focus of a large executive control literature (for reviews,
see Kiesel et al., 2010; Monsell, 2003; Vandierendonck et al.,
2010). Two major theories of the origin of the switch cost are
as follows. (1) Setting up the new task set is what requires the
most time and effort and can only be fully achieved after the
arrival of the sensory stimulus in the new task block (‘‘task-set re-
configuration’’; Monsell et al., 2000). (2) Dismantling the old task
set is what is difficult; therefore, the switch cost is mostly due to a
temporal carryover of the previous task set (‘‘task-set inertia’’;
Allport et al., 1994).
Reasoning that a rodent model would facilitate studies of
executive control over sensorimotor associations, we developed
an approach to train rats to perform a behavior involving single-
trial sensorimotor remapping. After a large number of unsuc-
cessful attempts, we found a particular sequence of shapingNeuron 86, 1491–1503, June 17, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 1491
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Figure 1. The Cued ProAnti Orienting Behavior
(A) Structure of the ProAnti orienting paradigm. On each trial, the identity of the
task cue (denoted by an easily distinguished auditory stimulus) indicates
whether the rat should orient toward (Pro) or away from (Anti) a subsequent
visual target (denoted by a left or right LED) in order to obtain a reward. Tasks
can switch from one trial to the next.
(B) Behavior timing. A light in the center port indicates that rats should nose
poke there to initiate a trial and keep their noses there until the center light
offset (‘‘fixation’’ period). During the first 1 s of the fixation period, a Pro (P) or
Anti (A) sound is played to indicate the current task, followed by a 500-ms silent
delay. The center LED is then turned off, indicating that the animal is now free
to withdraw from the center port, and themoment it withdraws, a left (L) or right
(R) LED is turned on to indicate the target location. RT is defined as the time
from target onset until side poke.
See also Figure S1.steps that takes naive rats and successfully trains 80% of the
subjects in a rapid task-reversal behavior analogous to the
pro/antisaccade paradigm. The training protocol was formalized
into computer code, which enables parallelized training of many
animals with minimal human intervention and should also greatly
facilitate replication of our results since the computerized proto-
col can be readily downloaded and identically re-run (see Sup-
plemental Information).
We found that, after training in our sensorimotor remapping
paradigm, rats displayed several behavioral asymmetries be-
tween Pro and Anti responses. All of these are similar to asym-
metries found in primates: Pro was easier to learn than Anti;
Pro was faster to execute than Anti; under several (but not all)
conditions, Pro performance was better than Anti performance;
and rats had an asymmetric switch cost in that the switch from
Anti to Pro led to a greater cost than the switch from Pro
to Anti. The same switch-cost asymmetry has been observed
in the primate pro/antisaccade paradigm (Cherkasova et al.,
2002; Everling and DeSouza, 2005; Weiler and Heath, 2012)
and in the Stroop task (Allport et al., 1994). These observations
suggest that some of the mechanisms underlying rapid sensori-
motor remapping may be comparable across species. They also
suggest that, as is thought in primates, Pro orienting in rats is1492 Neuron 86, 1491–1503, June 17, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.perhaps more reflexive or prepotent, whereas Anti orienting is
more cognitively demanding.
To better understand the neural mechanisms underlying this
rapid sensorimotor remapping behavior, we conducted inactiva-
tions of the superior colliculus (SC) and the prefrontal cortex
(PFC), two brain regions thought to be particularly important
for ProAnti behavior. In rodents, 70% or more of retinal ganglion
cells project to the superficial layers of the contralateral SC (Hof-
bauer and Dra¨ger, 1985; Lund et al., 1980), which, in turn, project
to the deeper motor layers on the same side of the SC (May,
2006)—which, in turn, are known to be involved in orienting mo-
tions across many species (Felsen and Mainen, 2008; Gandhi
and Katnani, 2011; Isa and Sasaki, 2002; Sparks, 1999). There-
fore, the SC is a candidate for mediating fast prepotent re-
sponses toward a visual target (Pro). In the human and monkey
pro/antisaccade behavior, the PFC has been implicated in Anti
responses (Guitton et al., 1985; Johnston and Everling, 2006;
McDowell et al., 2008; Munoz and Everling, 2004; Pierrot-Deseil-
ligny et al., 1991). Consistent with this view, the prelimbic cortex
(PL) of the rat medial PFC is thought to play an important role in
behavioral inhibition (Narayanan et al., 2006) and top-down con-
trol of behavior (Marquis et al., 2007; Rich and Shapiro, 2009).
Accordingly, we hypothesized that rat SC and the PL region of
the PFC should have dramatically different contributions to
Pro and Anti behaviors: the SC would be most critical for Pro
responses, while the PFC would be most critical for Anti
responses.
To test this, we reversibly inactivated these regions during the
ProAnti remapping behavior. PFC inactivation preferentially
impacted Anti performance, as predicted. However, contrary
to our expectations, bilateral SC inactivation had aminimal effect
on Pro trials. Instead, SC inactivation induced a significant
behavioral impairment on Anti trials. SC inactivation also elimi-
nated the cost of switching from Anti to Pro while leaving the
cost of switching from Pro to Anti intact. Thus, in support of
the ‘‘task-set inertia’’ theory of switch cost (Allport et al., 1994),
the data suggest a link between circuits involved in Anti behavior
and the cost of switching out of Anti. Together, our results indi-
cate that both SC and PFC play a role in behavioral inhibition
and flexible sensorimotor mapping and reveal a surprisingly spe-
cific role for the rodent SC in the cognitively demanding Anti task.
The SC has been linked to perceptual decision making in both
rodents (Felsen and Mainen, 2012) and primates (Horwitz and
Newsome, 1999), and in the primate literature, it has increasingly
been linked to higher cognitive processes, including abstract
perceptual decisions (Horwitz et al., 2004), attention (Goldberg
andWurtz, 1972; Ze´non and Krauzlis, 2012), and target selection
(McPeek and Keller, 2004). Our data suggest that, in rodents, the
SC may play a similarly important role in higher cognition and,
furthermore, add executive control to the list of cognitive pro-
cesses linked to the SC.
RESULTS
ProAnti Orienting Training and Performance
Training
We developed a computerized protocol to train rats to perform
both Pro and Anti orienting (Figure 1; Figure S1; full training
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C
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Figure 2. Rats Can Learn to Switch Tasks on
Single Trials
(A) Learning curve in the ProAnti orienting behavior.
Before training rats on the full ProAnti task-switching
paradigm, we habituated rats on the general para-
digm structure on one task only (labeled here as
‘‘Pro-only’’). Indicated here are Pro performance
(green) and Anti performance (orange) during daily
sessions averaged over 13 rats that started with
Pro-only training. Rats achieved almost perfect Pro
performance over the first few days, after which the
Anti task was introduced. To assist their learning of
the Anti task, rats were required to correct errors on
Anti trials for a delayed reward during the initial
training phase. Five of the 13 ratswere subsequently
tested on randomly interleaved Pro and Anti trials.
Error bars represent SE across rats. Thin lines show
learning curves of individual rats.
(B) ProandAnti performance for individual rats.Mean
and SE of Pro and Anti performance are computed
over sessions for each rat. Black symbols corre-
spond to sessionswhere rats performedProandAnti
trials in alternating blocks. Magenta symbols corre-
spond to sessionswith interleavedProandAnti trials.
(C) Left: example trials from a session of the block
design. Different rows indicate different trial types,
labeled at left by text indicating the task cue given
and the correct motor choice. Each trial’s outcome
is shown as either a green (hit) or red (error) dot.
Each task block consists of interleaved left (L) or
right (R) orienting responses. Right: example trials
from a session of the fully interleaved design.
(D) Learning (left) and performance (right) of a
separate group of animals that started with Anti-
only training (n = 8 rats). Error bars represent SE
across rats.
See also Figures S1 and S2.details and computer code are included in the Supplemental In-
formation). In brief, rats were first trained to good performance
on Pro orienting only (Figure 2A; Figure S1A). Alternating blocks
of Pro and Anti trials were then introduced. Although we did not
perform systematic searches, our pilot studies suggested that
two features in this training stage were critical. (1) Switching be-
tween blocks of Pro and blocks of Anti trials was performance-
based in that it only occurred if performance in the most recent
20 trials was greater than 70% correct. (2) Errors in Anti trials
were ‘‘correctable’’ in the sense that, on Anti trials, if animals
‘‘nose poked’’ into the incorrect side port, they were then
required to nose poke at the opposite (correct) side port and, af-
ter a short delay, were given a reward there. To incentivize cor-
rect performance, this delay to reward after a ‘‘corrected’’ side
poke was increased gradually over sessions until it reached 6
s. Rats that consistently reached >70% correct on both Pro
and Anti trials within single sessions were then moved to a final
stage in which errors on both Pro and Anti trials simply led to a
brief trial-terminating time-out without any possibility of reward,
and switching blocks to the opposite association now occurred
sooner, when performance in the most recent 10 trials was
greater than 70% correct and a minimum of 15 trials in the block
had elapsed (Figure 2C, left). This final stage was considered the
‘‘fully trained’’ stage. Rats performed an average of 11 switches
per session, with 20 trials per block.Some fully trained rats proceeded further to one of two stages:
Randomly interleaved ProAnti switching. Pro and Anti trials
were fully randomly interleaved, without any block structure
(Figure 2C, right).We found that no further trainingwasneeded
tomove to this stage. Rats performed at their asymptotic level
from the first randomly interleaved session (Figure 2A).
Random-length blocks, with no performance criterion. The
number of trials in a task block was not based on perfor-
mance but was determined at the beginning of the block,
chosen from a Gaussian distribution (mean = 15, SD = 5,
maximum = 25 trials per block; Figure S2A).
Performance
By design, the performance-based switching paradigm provides
more trainingon the loweraccuracy task. In thisparadigm,asymp-
totic performance for Pro (mean ± SEM, 79.5% ± 0.8%) was not
significantly different from that for Anti (79.1%±1.1%) (bootstrap-
ped p = 0.57, n = 13 rats; Figure 2B, black). In contrast, in the
randomly interleaved design, Pro performance (75.5% ± 1.3%)
was consistently better than Anti performance (72.4% ± 1.0%,
bootstrapped p < 103, n = 5 rats; Figure 2B, magenta). Asymp-
totic performance on random-length blocks was 77.7% ± 1.4%
in Pro and 76.8% ± 1.4% in Anti (Figure S2B). To study switch
cost between task blocks, we focus on the two block designs.Neuron 86, 1491–1503, June 17, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 1493
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Figure 3. Behavioral Asymmetry between
Pro and Anti Responses
(A and B) RT differences on Pro and Anti trials. (A)
Normalized RT distributions of an example rat.
Histograms of Pro and Anti RTs are shown here for
hits (top) and errors (bottom). Each curve is
normalized to have a total area of 1. Median RTs for
Pro hits, Anti hits, Anti errors, and Pro errors are
labeled as a, b, c, and d, respectively. (B) RT
summary of 13 individual rats. Left: median RTs for
Anti hits and Pro hits for all rats. Right: RT difference
between Pro and Anti, hits and errors, averaged
across all rats. For each rat, the difference between
median RTs of paired conditions was calculated.
White bar shows the mean and SE across rats for
Anti hit RTsminus Pro hit RTs. Green bar shows Pro
hit RTs minus Pro error RTs. Orange bar shows Anti
hit RTs minus Anti error RTs.
(C–E) Cost in percent correct and RT after task
switches. (C) Definition of switch cost: average
performance (perf) on the first trial of each block
minus performance on other trials of the same task
block. Data from Pro trials are in green (cost of
switching to Pro), and data from Anti trials are in
orange. (D) Left: percent correct as a function of trial
number relative to a task block switch. Each data point (connected by the thick lines) is the mean and SE across rats for Pro and Anti accuracy on three trials before
and after the switch. Thin lines show data from individual rats. Shaded area indicates new blocks after switches. Right: average accuracy switch cost for Pro trials
and Anti trials for all individual rats. (E) RT switch cost for Pro and Anti hits for all individual rats. Positive numbers indicate increase in RT during switch trials.Behavioral Asymmetries
Learning Asymmetry
For a separate group of rats, instead of beginning by training on
Pro-only trials first, we began by training them on Anti-only (Fig-
ures 2D and S1B). We found two differences between the Anti-
only-first group (n = 8 rats) and the Pro-only-first group (n = 13
rats). First, rats that began with Anti required multiple sessions
to learn the Anti-only behavior (Figure 2D, left) and reached an
asymptotic Anti-only performance of 91.8% ± 0.6%. In contrast,
rats typically learned Pro-only behavior within a single session
(Figure 2A) and reached a 98.7% ± 0.2% asymptotic perfor-
mance only one or two sessions later. This suggests that Anti
behavior, on its own, is harder to learn than Pro behavior on its
own. Second, after task block switches were introduced, none
of the rats trained on Anti-only first ever achieved above-chance
performance on both tasks. In particular, their Pro task behavior
persistently remained at near-chance levels (Figure 2D, right).
This suggests that, after training on the Anti-only behavior, rats
were less flexible than after training on the Pro-only behavior.
As a result of their chance performance on Pro trials, no rats in
the Anti-first groupwere considered to have successfully learned
the full ProAnti switching behavior, and we do not report further
analyses for this group of rats.
Response Time Asymmetry
Despite the similar fraction of correct trials in Pro and Anti
tasks within the performance-based switching paradigm, rats
executed Pro trials faster than Anti trials. The distribution of
response times (RTs, defined as time from visual target onset
to side port response) for an example rat is shown in Figure 3A.
Pro hits (median = 0.57 s) were significantly faster than Anti hits
(median = 0.68 s, t20166 =31.2, p < 1010). TheRTdifference be-
tween Pro hits and Anti hits was consistent across rats, despite1494 Neuron 86, 1491–1503, June 17, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.the substantial variability in individual rats’ median RT (Figure 3B,
left). On average, rats responded 51ms faster on Pro hits than on
Anti hits (bootstrappedp<103, n = 13 rats; Figure 3B, right). This
RT difference is similar to RT differences in nonhuman primate
pro/antisaccades (Everling et al., 1999) and Pro/Anti reaches
(Gail and Andersen, 2006). On error trials, the RT pattern was
more variable: rats were significantly faster on Anti errors than
on Anti hits (bootstrapped p < 0.05, n = 13 rats), but RTs for Pro
hits and Pro errors were not significantly different (p = 0.27).
Switch-Cost Asymmetry
The performance cost of switching from Anti to Pro blocks was
significantly larger than the cost of switching from Pro to Anti
blocks (Figures 3C–3E). That is, rats made more errors on the
first trial of each block (switch trial) than on other trials of the
same task block (block trials), and this accuracy drop was signif-
icantly larger when switching from Anti to Pro blocks (accuracy
drop = 36.5% ± 3.4%, mean ± SEM across rats) than when
switching from Pro to Anti blocks (drop = 10.6% ± 2.1%, boot-
strapped p < 103, n = 13 rats; Figure 3D). Despite the drop
in performance on switch trials, rats were clearly changing
behavior in response to the task cue on the first trial of a new
block: accuracy on switch trials was much higher than the
10% correct that would be expected if rats ignored the task
cue (since the pre-switch performance on these performance-
based block switches was 90% and the new task is a reversal,
we would expect 10% correct on the first trial before the animals
get any reward feedback). We also found an asymmetric switch
cost in RT (Figure 3E). There was a measurable RT switch cost
when switching out of Anti and into Pro, in the sense that, on cor-
rect Pro trials, animals responded significantly more slowly on
the first trial of the Pro task than on Pro block trials (bootstrapped
p < 0.01, n = 13 rats). In contrast, Anti hits displayed no
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Figure 4. Switch Cost Asymmetry Is Greater
after Longer Task Blocks, and Performance
on Post-error Switch Trials Is Similar to Per-
formance on Post-error Block Trials
(A) Switch cost asymmetry as a function of
previous block length. The cost of switching to Pro
or Anti trials, grouped by whether switching
happened after short blocks (1–8 trials per block)
or long blocks (9–16 or 17–24 trials per block).
Mean ± SEM across sessions was plotted for each
group. To study how muscimol affects behavioral
asymmetry, we focused on switch cost after long
blocks (more than eight trials per block).
(B and C) Asymmetric switch cost after long
blocks. (B) Average accuracy switch cost for Pro
and Anti trials for all individual rats after long
blocks, connected for each animal. (C) Average RT
switch cost for Pro and Anti hits for all individual
rats after long blocks.
(D and E) Effect of errors on performance (Perf) and
switch cost. (D) Post-hit Pro (green) and post-hit
Anti (orange) performance on block and switch
trials (mean ± SEM is indicated across individual rats for each condition) were compared to post-error Pro and Anti performance (gray). Dashed line in (D) right
indicates the average post-error block performance for comparison. (E) Post-error switch cost (gray), defined as the accuracy of post-error switch trials minus the
accuracy of post-error block trials, was significantly reduced compared to post-correct switch cost (green or orange for Pro or Anti, respectively; defined as the
accuracy of post-correct switch trials minus the accuracy of post-correct block trials).
See also Figure S3.significant RT cost for switching out of Pro and into Anti (p =
0.33). The paired difference between Pro / Anti and Anti /
Pro hit RT switch costs was significant across rats (bootstrapped
p < 103, n = 13 rats; Figure 3E).
Our results demonstrate that rats show the same switch cost
patterns that have been reported in the human pro/antisaccade
behavior (Cherkasova et al., 2002; Weiler and Heath, 2012), as
well as in the Stroop task (Allport et al., 1994). In these behaviors,
switching from the harder task (Anti and color naming, respec-
tively) to the easier task (Pro and word naming, respectively)
evokes a larger switch cost than the reverse.
Switch Cost in the Random-Block-Length Paradigm
To accurately assess the effect of inactivations, we trained rats
targeted for inactivation (n = 6 rats) on the random-block-length
design (Figure S2). We reasoned that, if the inactivation resulted
in a strong impairment in one task, a performance-based switch-
ing policy would leave the animal ‘‘stuck’’ in that task, and we
would not adequately sample performance on both tasks. In
addition to a greater variability in block length than the perfor-
mance-based design, the random-block-length design also pro-
duced task switches after error trials more often than the perfor-
mance-based design. Thus, the random-block-length design
allowed comparing switch costs after short versus long blocks
and facilitated the comparison of switch costs after correct
versus after error trials.
When animals switched tasks after a short block, there was no
asymmetry in switch cost. However, an asymmetry emerged
following long blocks (Figure 4A). The difference between Pro
and Anti accuracy switch costs positively correlated with the
block length immediately before switching (r = 0.71, p < 0.005,
n = 18 conditions: 6 rats 3 3 bins). To focus on the asymmetric
switch cost, we studied switch trials after long blocks (morethan eight trials). For such task switches, all six infusion rats
had significantly bigger accuracy drop and RT increase when
switching from Anti to Pro blocks than during the reverse switch
(bootstrapped p < 103, n = 6 rats; Figures 4B and 4C).
We then analyzed post-error performance and switch cost
(Figures 4D, 4E, and S3). One possible source of errors is
weak representation of the relevant task goal on that trial. Under
the task-set inertia theory (Allport et al., 1994), task-set carryover
would thus be reduced after errors, and the post-error switch
cost should be smaller than the post-correct switch cost (DeSi-
mone et al., 2014). As a basis for comparison, we first looked at
trials within a block that followed an error (‘‘post-error block tri-
als’’) and found that those trials displayed a substantial drop in
accuracy compared to post-correct block performance (average
post-error block trial performance = 69.0% ± 1.6%, a drop of
13.9% ± 1.1%, mean ± SEM across rats). This drop was not
significantly different for Pro versus Anti trials (Figure 4D). We
then analyzed post-error switch trials. We found that, consonant
with the task-set inertia theory’s prediction of a reduced switch
cost, performance on post-error switch trials was similar to per-
formance on post-error block trials (Figures 4D and 4E; average
performance = 66.4% ± 2.9% on post-error switch trials versus
69.0% ± 1.6% on post-error block trials, indicated by dashed
line). A repeated-measures two-way ANOVA revealed a signifi-
cant main effect of error, F(1, 5) = 103.9, p < 103; and task,
F(1, 5) = 34.0, p < 0.005, on switch cost but no significant inter-
action between error and task (p = 0.15).
Inactivations
After animals were fully trained, we implanted bilateral PFC (pre-
limbic cortex, PL) and SC (intermediate and deep layers)
cannulae in six trained rats (Figure 5; Figure S2C) and conducted
inactivations of these areas with muscimol (a GABA-A agonist)Neuron 86, 1491–1503, June 17, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 1495
A B C Figure 5. Cannula Placement Design and
Histology
(A) Within-subject design of cannula placement.
Top-down view of the rat brain with bilateral PFC
and SC target coordinates.
(B) Top: example coronal section of PFC cannula
implant. The tips of the bilateral guide cannulae
were placed 1.7 mm below the brain surface, with
the dummy extended 0.5 mm beyond the tip of the
guide and the injector (not visible here) extended
1.5 mm beyond the tip of the guide. Bottom: PFC
histology from all cannulated rats (diamonds).
(C) Top: example coronal section of SC cannula
implant to target the intermediate and deep layers.
The final injector depth at 4.8 mm below brain sur-
face and 1.8 mm lateral to midline. Bottom: SC
histology from all cannulated rats.during task performance. The effect of inactivations was quanti-
fied by comparing performance during muscimol sessions to the
corresponding control sessions 1 day before, thus controlling for
any potential effects of the cannulae implantation itself.
Unilateral Inactivations
SC Infusion
Consistent with previous rodent and primate literature indicating
the SC’s role in orienting movements (Felsen and Mainen, 2008;
Hikosaka and Wurtz, 1985), unilateral SC inactivation led to an
impairment in orienting contralaterally to the inactivated side
(+27.8% ± 5.4% change in error rate, mean ± SEM across ses-
sions) and a bias toward ipsilateral orienting (12.6% ± 2.5%
change in error rate; Figures 6A and 6B). The contralateral
impairment/ipsilateral bias did not depend on the identity of
the task: a repeated-measures two-way ANOVA revealed a sig-
nificant main effect of side (Go Contralateral [Go Contra] versus
Go Ipsilateral [Go Ipsi]) on error rate increase, F(1, 11) = 18.48,
p < 0.005; but no significant effect of task, Pro versus Anti,
F(1, 11) = 1.93, p = 0.19; or interaction, F(1, 11) = 0.01, p =
0.94 (Figure 6B). We also observed a significant increase in RT
on correct contralateral Anti responses (change = 100.2 ±
39.6 ms, t11 = 2.64, p < 0.05; Figures 6B and S4B).
PFC Infusion
Consistent with a role in Anti orienting, unilateral PL inactivation
led to a greater impairment on Anti trials (+15.1% ± 3.6%
change in error rate) than on Pro trials (+3.4%± 2.0%; Figure 6C).
There was a significant main effect of task on error rate in-
crease, F(1, 11) = 9.21, p < 0.05; but no significant effect of
side, F(1, 11) = 1.23, p = 0.29; or interaction between task and
side, F(1, 11) < 103, p = 0.99. No significant change in RT was
observed (ps > 0.05; Figures 6C and S4D).1496 Neuron 86, 1491–1503, June 17, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.Bilateral SC Inactivation
The results from unilateral SC inactivation
are consistent with the hypothesis that
the SC is a critical element of the Pro
pathway, but they are also consistent
with the possibility that imbalanced
competition between the two sides of SC
leads to a general orienting deficit. Todistinguish between these two hypotheses, we conducted bilat-
eral inactivation. The first hypothesis predicts a significant Pro
impairment after bilateral SC inactivation, whereas the second
hypothesis predicts a recovery of Pro performance.
We found that bilateral SC inactivation dramatically reduced
the large Pro impairment seen after unilateral inactivation. The
bilateral inactivation produced only a modest error rate increase
on Pro trials (+4.9%± 1.2%,mean ± SEM across sessions; trian-
gles in Figures 7Ai and 7Bi) that was not significantly different
from that for saline infusions (t36 = 0.92, p = 0.37; Figure S5Aii).
Surprisingly, and in contrast to the result for Pro trials, bilateral
SC inactivation produced a major impairment on Anti trials
(+24.8% ± 3.2%, t27 = 7.82, p < 10
7). This robust Anti impair-
ment was observed for all rats (bootstrapped p < 103, n = 5
rats; Figure 7Ci). There was no correlation between baseline
Anti performance and the magnitude of Anti impairment (r =
0.07, p = 0.92, n = 28 sessions), suggesting that the observed
task-specific effect was not merely a general difficulty deficit, a
point that we revisit in the Discussion section.
Rats slowed down after bilateral SC inactivation, even when
they correctly performed Pro or Anti motions (RT increase
compared to control on Pro trials: 50.5 ± 17.4 ms, t27 = 2.95,
p < 0.01; RT increase compared to controls on Anti trials:
37.4 ± 20.3 ms, t27 = 1.88, p = 0.07; Figure 7Di). Rats also slowed
down on Pro errors (77.0 ± 22.9 ms, t27 = 3.43, p < 0.01) but did
not significantly slow down on Anti errors (19.6 ± 22.3 ms, t27 =
0.90, p = 0.38).
Bilateral PFC Inactivation
Because the rat PL plays a non-lateralized role in the ProAnti
behavior (Figure 6C), unilateral inactivation may have failed to
reveal some behavioral deficits due to compensation from the
AB
C
Figure 6. Unilateral SC Inactivations Cause a Task-Independent
Ipsilateral Bias, while Unilateral PFC Inactivations Cause a Side-In-
dependent Anti Impairment
(A) Example session of unilateral SC inactivation. Error rates for Pro and Anti
trials in amuscimol (musc) session (solid) are plotted next to the corresponding
(i.e., previous day’s) control session (hollow). Trials where animals were in-
structed to orient ipsilaterally (Go Ipsi) or contralaterally (Go Contra, shaded) to
the infusion sitewere analyzedseparately. Thedifference in error rates between
muscimol and control sessionswas calculated for each experiment andplotted
in (B) and (C) across all sessions.
(B) Effect of unilateral SC infusion on accuracy (left) and RT (right). Left: error
rate increase on Pro and Anti Go Ipsi and Go Contra trials (mean ± SEM across
all sessions). Right: RT change, defined as the difference betweenmedian RTs
(inmilliseconds) inmuscimol and corresponding control sessions. Significance
of main effects and significance of interaction were calculated using a
repeated-measures two-way ANOVA. Main effects of task (Pro versus Anti)
and side (ipsi- versus contralateral movement) are shown here.
(C) Effect of unilateral PFC infusion on accuracy (left) and RT (right), similar
to (B).
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; N.S., not significant.
See also Figure S4.contralateral PL. To address this concern, we performed bilateral
PL inactivation. We found a larger error rate increase on Anti
trials than what had been obtained by unilateral inactivation
(+27.7% ± 2.8%, compared to control; t27 = 9.93, p < 10
9;
circles in Figures 7Aii and 7Bii). After bilateral PL inactivation,
we also observed a significant impairment in Pro performance
(+10.6% ± 2.4%, t27 = 4.60, p < 10
4). Nonetheless, rats
continued to be substantially more impaired on Anti trials than
on Pro trials (paired t test, t27 = 5.59, p < 10
5).
Rats were faster on Pro hits, Anti hits, and Anti errors after
bilateral PL inactivation, compared to control sessions (RT
decrease on Pro hits: 42.4 ± 17.1 ms, t27 = 2.52, p < 0.05; RT
decrease on Anti hits: 78.5 ± 20.2 ms, t27 = 3.96, p < 103;
RT decrease on Anti errors: 68.4 ± 20.4 ms, t27 = 3.41, p <
0.01; Figure 7Dii), but there was no significant RT change for
Pro errors (11.1 ± 20.7 ms, p = 0.59).
Additional control experiments confirmed that the effect of
PFC infusion was mainly due to PL inactivation and not due to
backflow of muscimol along the cannula tract into the anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC; Figures S5Aiv and S5Biv).
Effect of Inactivations on Switch Cost
The selective impairment of Anti performance after bilateral SC
or bilateral PFC inactivations suggested that the dominant effect
of these inactivations is to disrupt the circuit necessary for Anti
behavior. Assuming that this is the circuit underlying the Anti
task set, this provided the opportunity to causally test whether
carryover from the Anti task set is what leads to the switch
cost on subsequent Pro switch trials, as predicted by the task-
set inertia theory. To eliminate the confounding effect of errors
on switch cost, we focused our analysis on post-correct switch
trials only. Remarkably, we found that bilateral SC inactivation
completely eliminated the cost of switching to Pro blocks (per-
mutation test, p < 103, Figures 8A–8C). In contrast, despite
the general deficit in Anti performance after SC inactivation,
the cost of switching to Anti blocks remained the same as control
(p = 0.99). In other words, a single manipulation selectively
affected both Anti performance and the cost of switching out
of Anti, while it left Pro performance and the cost of switching
out of Pro (i.e., switching to Anti) unchanged. A similar pattern
of results was found after bilateral PFC inactivation, which,
compared to control sessions, significantly reduced the cost of
switching out of Anti blocks (permutation test, p < 0.05; Figures
8D–8F), while the cost of switching out of Pro blocks remained
unchanged (p = 0.68).
DISCUSSION
We established a rodent model of rapid switching between two
familiar pairs of stimulus-action associations. The two pairs are
reversals of each other: the Pro task requires associating a left
light with orienting left, and associating a right light with orienting
right. In contrast, the Anti task associates the left light with orient-
ing right, and the right light with orienting left (Figure 1). A switch
from one task to the other thus requires re-routing stimulus-
induced neural activity from one associated response to its
opposite. Following an automated protocol, rats were trained
to perform cued Pro and Anti trials in interleaved blocks. WithoutNeuron 86, 1491–1503, June 17, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 1497
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Figure 7. Bilateral SC and PFC Inactivations
Both Cause Large Anti Performance Impair-
ment but Much Smaller Pro Impairment
(A) Example session of bilateral (bl) SC (i) or PFC (ii)
inactivation from one rat. Error rates for Pro and Anti
trials in muscimol session (solid) are plotted next to
the corresponding (i.e., previous day’s) control ses-
sion (hollow). The difference in error rates between
muscimol and control sessions was calculated for
each experiment and plotted in (B–E) across all
sessions or for individual rats. Triangles and circles
represent SC and PFC infusions, respectively.
(B and C) Effect of bilateral infusions on accuracy.
Error rate increases on Pro and Anti trials due to
bilateral inactivations are plotted for SC (i) and PFC
(ii). (B) Means ± SEM across all sessions for bilateral
SC or PFC inactivations. (C) Each data point repre-
sents the mean effect across sessions for a single
rat; lines connect data points from the same rat.
(D and E) Effect of bilateral infusions on RT. RT
changes, defined as the difference of median RT (in
milliseconds) in each muscimol session and its cor-
responding control session, are plotted here for all
sessions (D) and for each rat (E). (D) Medians across
all sessions are indicated by the central mark of each
box, 25th and 75th percentiles are indicated by the
edge of each box, data points lying at a distance
from the nearest box edge that is more than 1.5
times the height of the box are considered outliers,
indicated by the symbol x, and vertical lines extend
to the furthest data point that is not an outlier.
(E) Means across sessions for individual rats are
shown. Green indicates Pro hits; orange indicates
Anti hits. Positive values represent slowing due to
muscimol; negative values represent speeding due
to muscimol.
See also Figure S5.further training, rats successfully performed randomly inter-
mingled Pro and Anti trials (Figure 2). Thus, rats can switch the
action associated with a stimulus immediately after the change
in task cue without any error-driven re-learning. This differs
from most behavioral flexibility studies in rodents, in which
uncued set shifts or stimulus-action reversals are indicated by
errors, and behavior changes gradually over multiple trials (Dur-
stewitz et al., 2010; Floresco et al., 2008; Kimchi and Laubach,
2009; Ragozzino et al., 1999; Rich and Shapiro, 2007). Our
task also differs from more recent task-switching studies, in
which stimulus-action associations are kept constant across
the experiment (Baker and Ragozzino, 2014; Leenaars et al.,
2012), and a task switch, therefore, does not require re-routing
neural activity from one stimulus/ action pathway to another.
Finally, our task differs from response conflict studies in which
either behavior changes slowly over many trials (Oualian and
Gisquet-Verrier, 2010) or each trial itself unfolds over more1498 Neuron 86, 1491–1503, June 17, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.than a minute (Haddon et al., 2008). In
these latter tasks, slow timescale mecha-
nisms could be involved in response
switching.
Reversing associations on the rapid
timescale used here—a second or less—makes rodent task switching equally as fast as those used in
comparable human and non-human primate behaviors, facili-
tating cross-species comparisons. Furthermore, rapid switching
significantly constrains the neural mechanisms that can underlie
the reversal. For example, changes in structural connections be-
tween neurons or in gene expression would be too slow and can,
therefore, be ruled out. Rapid switching may involve macrocir-
cuits that are different from those required for switching on
slower timescales: multiple groups have found that performance
in a reversal learning paradigm, which occurs over many trials,
does not require the medial PFC (mPFC) (Floresco et al., 2008;
Rich and Shapiro, 2007). In contrast, we found that Anti perfor-
mance during rapid stimulus-action reversals was substantially
impaired after mPFC inactivation (Figures 6, 7, and 8).
Rats displayed several asymmetries between Pro and Anti re-
sponses, similar to observations in the primate pro/antisaccade
behavior (Munoz and Everling, 2004). Pro was easier to learn
BILATERAL SC inactivation eliminated switch to Pro cost, but left switch to Anti cost intact
BILATERAL PFC inactivation reduced switch to Pro cost, but left switch to Anti cost intact 
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Figure 8. Bilateral SC or PFC Inactivations
Eliminate or Reduce Cost of Switching
from Anti to Pro, while Leaving the Cost of
Switching from Pro to Anti Intact
To control for any interaction between errors and
switch cost, all trials following errors were
excluded from the analyses in this figure.
(A–C) Effect of bilateral SC inactivation on switch
cost. (A) Pro and Anti performance on switch tri-
als (first trial of a task block) and block trials
(other trials of the block) for control sessions; the
performance difference between switch and
block trials is the cost of switching to that task.
Data points shown are the mean and 95% con-
fidence intervals (95% confident that the true
value of the population is within the interval, re-
flecting a significance level of 0.05) of trials
concatenated across all sessions from all rats.
The confidence intervals for block trials were
relatively small, due to the larger sample size. (B)
Same format as in (A), but data are from sessions
after bilateral SC inactivation. (C) Switch cost,
calculated from the data in (A) and (B), after
bilateral SC inactivation (green or orange for Pro
or Anti, respectively) compared to control ses-
sions (gray).
(D–F) Same format as (A–C), but data are from PFC control sessions (days immediately preceding PFC inactivations) and bilateral PFC inactivation sessions.
Error bars indicate 95% confidence intervals. The paired statistics shown here were computed using a permutation test, shuffled 5,000 times.than Anti (Figure 2); Pro was faster to execute than Anti (Figures
3A and 3B); under several (but not all) conditions, Pro perfor-
mance was better than Anti performance (Figure 2B); and rats
had an asymmetric switch cost (Figures 3C–3E), meaning that
performance on the first trial of a block was impaired compared
to performance on trials within blocks, and this switch cost was
greater when switching from Anti to Pro than from Pro to Anti
(Cherkasova et al., 2002; Everling and DeSouza, 2005; Weiler
and Heath, 2012). As in primates, these asymmetries support
Pro responses as prepotent and Anti responses as more cogni-
tively demanding in these trained animals.
Causal Perturbations and Support for the Task-Set
Inertia Theory
The robust asymmetric switch cost in accuracy and RT (Figures
3D and 3E) is consistent with other human task-switching para-
digms such as the Stroop task (Wylie and Allport, 2000). This
asymmetry has been interpreted as support for the task-set
inertia theory of switch cost (Allport et al., 1994), which posits
that dismantling the old task set is difficult and, therefore, switch
cost is mostly due to a temporal carryover of the previous task
set. The other major theory of switch cost is the ‘‘task-set recon-
figuration’’ theory, which proposes that setting up the new task
set is what requires time and effort and can only be fully achieved
after the arrival of the sensory stimulus in the new task block
(Monsell et al., 2000; Rogers and Monsell, 1995). Our muscimol
infusions supported the task-set inertia theory in that they re-
vealed that disrupting the Anti circuit eliminated the cost of
switching out of Anti but left the cost of switching to Anti intact
(Figure 8). To our knowledge, this is the first causal evidence for
the task-set inertia theory. In addition, when Anti orienting was
impaired, the first Pro trial was as accurate as the later Pro trials,indicating that full switching toProcouldoccur before completing
the first Pro trial, arguing against the task-set reconfiguration the-
ory. An alternative interpretation could be that, after bilateral
inactivations, animals were only performing Pro orienting and,
therefore, never switched between the two tasks. We found this
explanation unlikely. First, there was still a significant switch
cost from Pro to Anti tasks after bilateral inactivations (Figure 8),
suggesting that, despite a general Anti impairment, animals were
switching between the two tasks. Second, bilateral inactivations
did not result in a near-zero Anti accuracy or an improvement in
Pro accuracy, so animals did not adopt the strategy of only per-
forming Pro orienting after inactivations. Therefore, for rats in
the ProAnti task-switching behavior, the switch cost is domi-
nated by task-set inertia. Changing task parameters may shift
the source of the switch cost (Yeung and Monsell, 2003).
We found that rat behavior recapitulated a further result
recently reported in humans (DeSimone et al., 2014) in that the
cost of switching out of Anti only occurred after correct Anti trials
but not after Anti errors (Figure 4E). Furthermore, we found that, if
the neural structures necessary for Anti behavior were impaired,
the cost of switching out of Antiwas eliminated, even after correct
Anti responses (Figure 8). This causal manipulation result sug-
gests that a correct Anti motor act is not sufficient to induce a
switch cost and that the critical requirement for the cost of
switching out of Anti is the Anti task set itself, consistent with
Yeung et al.’s (2014) interpretation of their behavioral data in
humans.
The Role of PL
Perturbation (Floresco et al., 2008; Haddon and Killcross,
2006; Joel et al., 1997;Marquis et al., 2007; Oualian andGisquet-
Verrier, 2010; Ragozzino et al., 1999; Rich and Shapiro,Neuron 86, 1491–1503, June 17, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 1499
2007; Seamans et al., 1995) and physiology (Durstewitz et al.,
2010; Karlsson et al., 2012; Narayanan and Laubach, 2006;
Rich and Shapiro, 2009; Rodgers and DeWeese, 2014) studies
suggest a role of rat PL in cognitive control of behavior. We
showed that rat PL is important for maintaining the overall perfor-
mance during rapid sensorimotor remapping, with a preferential
involvement in the Anti task. If PL were primarily necessary for
switching, we would have expected bigger switch costs after
PL inactivation. Instead, PL inactivation reduced the cost of
switching out of Anti and did not affect the cost of switching
out of Pro (Figure 8). This suggests a more important role for
PL in task-set maintenance than in actively driving the switching
of stimulus-action associations per se. This interpretation is
consistent with single-unit recordings in rat mPFC that indicate
its role in representing the current task goal (Durstewitz et al.,
2010; Rodgers and DeWeese, 2014), especially for the cogni-
tively demanding Anti task. We also confirmed that the effect
of mPFC inactivation was mainly due to PL impairment, not
ACC (Figures S5Aiv and S5Biv), demonstrating a similarity be-
tween the rat data and a recent comparison of cooling dorsolat-
eral PFC (dlPFC) and ACC in a monkey pro/antisaccade para-
digm (Koval et al., 2014).
The Role of SC
The intermediate and deep layers of SC, across many species,
have been implicated as essential for controlling orienting be-
haviors (Gandhi and Katnani, 2011; Isa and Sasaki, 2002; Sparks
and Hartwich-Young, 1989; Sparks, 1999). Permanent or revers-
ible lesions of the deep layers of unilateral SC resulted in contra-
lateral orienting deficits (Felsen andMainen, 2008; Hikosaka and
Wurtz, 1985; 1986; Sinnamon and Garcia, 1988; Sprague and
Meikle, 1965), including increased latency and error of orienting
movements. Our unilateral SC inactivation confirmed its impor-
tance in general orienting responses (Figure 6B), even in the
context of a sophisticated executive control paradigm. The se-
lective slowing of contralateral Anti responses revealed a subtle
task selectivity that was otherwise dominated by the lateralized
effect.
As described in the Introduction, rodent SC anatomy literature
motivated our prediction that bilateral SC inactivation would
impair Pro responses and, consequently, facilitate Anti re-
sponses. In contrast, we found that Pro responses were left
largely intact, while Anti responses were strongly impaired (Fig-
ure 7). The recovery of Pro performance after bilateral SC inacti-
vation is reminiscent of the reduction in the behavioral impair-
ment induced by unilateral lesions or inactivations when the
opposite SC is lesioned or silenced in rats (Sinnamon andGarcia,
1988) and cats (Lomber et al., 2001), but here, it occurs together
with a simultaneous impairment in Anti responses in the context
of a ProAnti switching behavior. It should be noted that correct
Pro responses were slower after bilateral SC inactivation, sug-
gesting that the SC is involved in Pro orienting under normal
conditions but that there are alternative pathways to support
the choice of right versus left orienting in what may be an impor-
tant naturalistic behavior. One such pathway may originate
from premotor cortex (Erlich et al., 2011) and may project to
brainstem nuclei involved in orienting other than the SC (Schiller
et al., 1979).1500 Neuron 86, 1491–1503, June 17, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.The major Anti impairment after bilateral SC inactivation re-
veals the SC as necessary for Anti orienting responses. This
was not a non-specific impairment due to Anti being a harder
task than Pro for two reasons. First, there was no correlation
between Anti accuracy (a measure of subjective difficulty) on
control days and Anti impairment on infusion days. Second, on
control days, the hardest trial type of all (i.e., the trial type with
the lowest percent correct) is the first trial of a Pro block; yet per-
formance in these difficult trials was markedly improved after
bilateral SC inactivation. Therefore, greater trial difficulty did
not lead to a greater impairment. Our data add to the growing
list of cognitive functions associated with the SC, including
perceptual decisionmaking in both primates (Horwitz andNews-
ome, 1999) and rodents (Felsen and Mainen, 2012) and, in pri-
mates, abstract perceptual decisions (Horwitz et al., 2004),
attention (Goldberg and Wurtz, 1972; Ze´non and Krauzlis,
2012), target selection (McPeek and Keller, 2004), and others.
Within the ProAnti behavior, future experiments will be needed
to distinguish whether the SC is primarily required for the imple-
mentation of Anti motor act after the appearance of the target
stimulus or whether the SC is necessary for the maintenance
of the Anti task set itself.
Interactions between PFC and SC
In the human and monkey pro/antisaccade behavior, it has
been hypothesized that PFC prevents stimulus-driven Pro re-
sponses via suppression of neural activity in the SC during
Anti performance (the ‘‘inhibition model’’; Pierrot-Deseilligny
et al., 1991). The inhibition model of prefrontal function in
the antisaccade task has been widely supported by human
lesion studies (Guitton et al., 1985; Pierrot-Deseilligny et al.,
1991), human functional imaging studies (McDowell et al.,
2008), and non-human primate neurophysiological recordings
(Dorris et al., 1997; Everling et al., 1998, 1999; Johnston and
Everling, 2006). However, recent perturbation experiments in
the primate PFC have started to question the long-held inhibi-
tion model (Condy et al., 2007; Wegener et al., 2008; Johnston
et al., 2014). Notably, Johnston and colleagues (2014) simulta-
neously cooled PFC while recording in the SC and showed
that, contrary to the inhibition model, PFC activity had an
excitatory effect on SC saccade-related neurons. Although
we did not directly test the interactions between PFC and
SC in the present study, our rat SC inactivation results are
consistent with and complementary to these recent challenges
to the inhibition model: in contrast to the inhibition model,
silencing the SC did not promote Anti responses but instead
impaired them. Together, our rodent SC inactivation data
and the primate PFC perturbation data (Condy et al., 2007;
Wegener et al., 2008; Johnston et al., 2014) argue against
the long-held view that suppression of SC activity is needed
for Anti performance. Instead, as Everling and Johnston
(2013) proposed, task-relevant information may flow from
PFC to SC neurons to facilitate goal-directed responses.
Nevertheless, whether the flow of task information is unidirec-
tional, from the PFC to the SC, or whether the SC also sends
task-relevant information back to the PFC (through feedback
projections via the mediodorsal thalamus) remains to be
determined.
General Discussion
Here, we provided a rodent ProAnti task-switching behavior that,
to our knowledge, is the most closely parallel to comparable pri-
mate tasks in its structure, its timing, and its cued single-trial,
seconds-timescale sensorimotor remapping. The resulting rat
behavior demonstrates numerous behavioral parallels to that of
primates. This suggests that the relevant neural circuit mecha-
nisms in rodents, which are of interest in their own right, may
also be comparable to, and could illuminate, circuit mechanisms
in primates. Given the experimental tractability of rodents, we
believe that the rat ProAnti paradigm will be a powerful animal
model for studying the neural basis of executive control,
response inhibition, and task switch cost (Miller and Cohen,
2001; Stoet and Snyder, 2009).
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Subjects
Animal use procedures were approved by the Princeton University Institutional
Animal Care and Use Committee and carried out in accordance with NIH stan-
dards. All subjects were adult male Long-Evans rats (Taconic) placed on a
restricted water schedule to motivate them to work for a water reward.
The ProAnti Orienting Behavior
Behavioral Training
We trained 13 rats on the ProAnti orienting behavior (Figure 1). Rats went
through several stages of an automated training protocol (Figure S1). In the
final stage, each trial began with an LED turning on in the center port, cuing
the rats to poke there and initiate a trial. Rats were required to keep their nose
in the center port (nose fixation) until the light turned off as a ‘‘Go’’ signal (Fig-
ure 1B). Broken fixation trials were ignored in all analyses. The duration of the
fixation period was 1.5 s, and the task cue sound was played during the first 1
s. Task cues were clearly distinguishable FM modulated sounds, with
different carrier and modulation frequencies, and were counterbalanced in
different animals. After the task sound ended, the next 500 ms of nose fixa-
tion consisted of a silent delay period, after which the center light was extin-
guished and rats were allowed to withdraw from the center port. Then, a
target stimulus would be presented by turning on one of the side port
LEDs; this remained on until rats poked into one of the two side ports. For
Pro trials, rats were rewarded for orienting to the side port with the light;
for Anti trials, rats were rewarded for orienting to the side port without the
light. A correct choice was rewarded by 24 ml of water; and an incorrect
choice resulted in a loud sound, no reward delivery, and a short trial-terminat-
ing time-out.
Task-Switch Paradigm
We first trained rats (n = 13) to perform alternating blocks of Pro and Anti trials,
where block switches occurred within single sessions, after a minimum of 15
trials per block, and when a local estimate of performance (over the last ten tri-
als in this block) reached a threshold of 70% correct. We then trained five rats
to perform completely interleaved Pro and Anti trials. To accurately assess the
effect of inactivations, all cannulated rats (n = 6 rats) were trained on the
random-block design, where block switches were not dependent on the local
estimate of performance. Instead, the length for each block was drawn
randomly from aGaussian distribution (mean = 15, SD= 5,maximum= 25 trials
per block).
Cannula Implant Surgery
Surgicalmethodswere identical to thosedescribedpreviously (Erlichetal., 2011;
see also Supplemental Experimental Procedures). Rats (n = 6) were implanted
bilaterally in mPFC (+3.2 anteroposterior [AP] mm, ±0.75 mediolateral [ML] mm
from bregma) and in SC (6.8 AP mm, ±1.8 ML mm) with 22-gauge guide
cannulae (four cannulae per animal). The final depth of the injector (28 AWG)
was 3.2 mm below the brain surface for mPFC and 4.8 mm for SC, targeting
PL and the intermediate and deep layers of the SC (Figure 5).Infusions
Infusions were performed once a week to minimize adaptation to the effects of
muscimol and to have stable performance in sessions 1 day before infusions.
These control sessions were used as a baseline reference for characterizing
the inactivation results. We also performed isoflurane and saline control exper-
iments (see Supplemental Experimental Procedures). For bilateral infusions,
0.3 ml of 0.25 mg/ml muscimol was infused in each brain area (0.075 mg per site,
0.150 mg in total). Considering the hemispheric competition, a lower dose was
used (0.3 ml of 0.125 mg/ml) for unilateral infusions. Previous experiments in the
rat (Krupa et al., 1999; Martin, 1991) suggest that the inactivated area at these
doseswould have an1-mm radius. Unilateral inactivations were balanced be-
tween infusing the left and right sides of the brain in all individual rats.
Analysis and Statistics
All analyses and statistics were computed in MATLAB (The Mathworks).
A paired Student’s t test was used to compare Pro and Anti behavioral
characteristics across sessions. Bootstrap or permutation tests were
used for all across-rat analyses. To characterize behavioral biases after uni-
lateral inactivations, a repeated-measures two-way ANOVA was conducted
to test the within-subject main effect of task (Pro versus Anti), side (ipsi-
versus contralateral movement) and interaction (Task 3 Side). Similarly, a
two-way ANOVA was used to test the effect of errors on subsequent switch
cost.
SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
Supplemental Information includes Supplemental Experimental Procedures
and five figures and can be found with this article online at http://dx.doi.org/
10.1016/j.neuron.2015.05.042.
AUTHOR CONTRIBUTIONS
C.A.D. collected and analyzed the behavioral and pharmacological data.
C.D.B. and J.C.E. developed and piloted earlier versions of the behavior,
and C.A.D. contributed to the final design of the behavior. C.A.D. and C.D.B.
wrote the paper. C.D.B. and J.C.E. were involved in all aspects of experimental
design and data analysis.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We thank A. Akrami, A. El Hady, C. Kopec, T. Hanks, K. Miller, A. Piet, and M.
Yartsev for comments on the manuscript. We thank J. Teran, R. Latourette, K.
Osorio, A. Begelfer-Ostrovski, and P. Bibawi for animal and laboratory sup-
port. C.A.D. was supported by a Howard Hughes Medical Institute interna-
tional student fellowship.
Received: January 26, 2015
Revised: April 6, 2015
Accepted: May 17, 2015
Published: June 17, 2015
REFERENCES
Allport, D.A., Styles, E.A., and Hsieh, S. (1994). Shifting intentional set:
exploring the dynamic control of tasks. In Attention and Performance XV:
Conscious and Nonconscious Information Processing, C. Umilta` and M.
Moscovitch, eds. (Cambridge: MIT Press), pp. 421–452.
Baker, P.M., and Ragozzino, M.E. (2014). The prelimbic cortex and subthala-
mic nucleus contribute to cue-guided behavioral switching. Neurobiol. Learn.
Mem. 107, 65–78.
Cherkasova, M.V., Manoach, D.S., Intriligator, J.M., and Barton, J.J.S. (2002).
Antisaccades and task-switching: interactions in controlled processing. Exp.
Brain Res. 144, 528–537.
Condy, C., Wattiez, N., Rivaud-Pe´choux, S., Tremblay, L., and Gaymard, B.
(2007). Antisaccade deficit after inactivation of the principal sulcus inmonkeys.
Cereb. Cortex 17, 221–229.Neuron 86, 1491–1503, June 17, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 1501
DeSimone, J.C.,Weiler, J., Aber, G.S., andHeath, M. (2014). The unidirectional
prosaccade switch-cost: correct and error antisaccades differentially influ-
ence the planning times for subsequent prosaccades. Vision Res. 96, 17–24.
Dorris, M.C., Pare´, M., andMunoz, D.P. (1997). Neuronal activity inmonkey su-
perior colliculus related to the initiation of saccadic eye movements.
J. Neurosci. 17, 8566–8579.
Durstewitz, D., Vittoz, N.M., Floresco, S.B., and Seamans, J.K. (2010). Abrupt
transitions between prefrontal neural ensemble states accompany behavioral
transitions during rule learning. Neuron 66, 438–448.
Erlich, J.C., Bialek, M., and Brody, C.D. (2011). A cortical substrate for mem-
ory-guided orienting in the rat. Neuron 72, 330–343.
Everling, S., and Fischer, B. (1998). The antisaccade: a review of basic
research and clinical studies. Neuropsychologia 36, 885–899.
Everling, S., and DeSouza, J.F.X. (2005). Rule-dependent activity for prosac-
cades and antisaccades in the primate prefrontal cortex. J. Cogn. Neurosci.
17, 1483–1496.
Everling, S., and Johnston, K. (2013). Control of the superior colliculus by the
lateral prefrontal cortex. Philos. Trans. R. Soc. Lond. B Biol. Sci. 368,
20130068.
Everling, S., Dorris,M.C., andMunoz,D.P. (1998). Reflexsuppression in the anti-
saccade task is dependent on prestimulus neural processes. J. Neurophysiol.
80, 1584–1589.
Everling, S., Dorris, M.C., Klein, R.M., and Munoz, D.P. (1999). Role of primate
superior colliculus in preparation and execution of anti-saccades and pro-sac-
cades. J. Neurosci. 19, 2740–2754.
Fassihi, A., Akrami, A., Esmaeili, V., and Diamond, M.E. (2014). Tactile percep-
tion and working memory in rats and humans. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 111,
2331–2336.
Felsen, G., andMainen, Z.F. (2008). Neural substrates of sensory-guided loco-
motor decisions in the rat superior colliculus. Neuron 60, 137–148.
Felsen, G., and Mainen, Z.F. (2012). Midbrain contributions to sensorimotor
decision making. J. Neurophysiol. 108, 135–147.
Floresco, S.B., Block, A.E., and Tse, M.T.L. (2008). Inactivation of the medial
prefrontal cortex of the rat impairs strategy set-shifting, but not reversal
learning, using a novel, automated procedure. Behav. Brain Res. 190, 85–96.
Gail, A., and Andersen, R.A. (2006). Neural dynamics in monkey parietal reach
region reflect context-specific sensorimotor transformations. J. Neurosci. 26,
9376–9384.
Gandhi, N.J., and Katnani, H.A. (2011). Motor functions of the superior collicu-
lus. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 34, 205–231.
Goldberg,M.E., andWurtz, R.H. (1972). Activity of superior colliculus inbehaving
monkey. II. Effect of attention on neuronal responses. J. Neurophysiol. 35,
560–574.
Guitton, D., Buchtel, H.A., and Douglas, R.M. (1985). Frontal lobe lesions in
man cause difficulties in suppressing reflexive glances and in generating
goal-directed saccades. Exp. Brain Res. 58, 455–472.
Haddon, J.E., and Killcross, S. (2006). Prefrontal cortex lesions disrupt the
contextual control of response conflict. J. Neurosci. 26, 2933–2940.
Haddon, J.E., George, D.N., and Killcross, S. (2008). Contextual control of
biconditional task performance: evidence for cue and response competition
in rats. Q. J. Exp. Psychol. (Hove) 61, 1307–1320.
Hallett, P.E. (1978). Primary and secondary saccades to goals defined by in-
structions. Vision Res. 18, 1279–1296.
Hikosaka, O., and Wurtz, R.H. (1985). Modification of saccadic eye move-
ments by GABA-related substances. I. Effect of muscimol and bicuculline in
monkey superior colliculus. J. Neurophysiol. 53, 266–291.
Hikosaka, O., and Wurtz, R.H. (1986). Saccadic eye movements following in-
jection of lidocaine into the superior colliculus. Exp. Brain Res. 61, 531–539.
Hofbauer, A., and Dra¨ger, U.C. (1985). Depth segregation of retinal ganglion
cells projecting to mouse superior colliculus. J. Comp. Neurol. 234, 465–474.1502 Neuron 86, 1491–1503, June 17, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc.Horwitz, G.D., and Newsome, W.T. (1999). Separate signals for target selec-
tion and movement specification in the superior colliculus. Science 284,
1158–1161.
Horwitz, G.D., Batista, A.P., and Newsome, W.T. (2004). Representation of an
abstract perceptual decision in macaque superior colliculus. J. Neurophysiol.
91, 2281–2296.
Hutton, S.B., and Ettinger, U. (2006). The antisaccade task as a research tool in
psychopathology: a critical review. Psychophysiology 43, 302–313.
Isa, T., and Sasaki, S. (2002). Brainstem control of headmovements during ori-
enting; organization of the premotor circuits. Prog. Neurobiol. 66, 205–241.
Jaramillo, S., Borges, K., and Zador, A.M. (2014). Auditory thalamus and audi-
tory cortex are equally modulated by context during flexible categorization of
sounds. J. Neurosci. 34, 5291–5301.
Joel, D., Weiner, I., and Feldon, J. (1997). Electrolytic lesions of the medial pre-
frontal cortex in rats disrupt performance on an analog of the Wisconsin Card
Sorting Test, but do not disrupt latent inhibition: implications for animal models
of schizophrenia. Behav. Brain Res. 85, 187–201.
Johnston, K., and Everling, S. (2006). Monkey dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
sends task-selective signals directly to the superior colliculus. J. Neurosci.
26, 12471–12478.
Johnston, K., Koval, M.J., Lomber, S.G., and Everling, S. (2014). Macaque
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex does not suppress saccade-related activity in
the superior colliculus. Cereb. Cortex 24, 1373–1388.
Karlsson, M.P., Tervo, D.G., and Karpova, A.Y. (2012). Network resets in
medial prefrontal cortex mark the onset of behavioral uncertainty. Science
338, 135–139.
Kiesel, A., Steinhauser, M., Wendt, M., Falkenstein, M., Jost, K., Philipp, A.M.,
and Koch, I. (2010). Control and interference in task switching—a review.
Psychol. Bull. 136, 849–874.
Kimchi, E.Y., and Laubach,M. (2009). Dynamic encoding of action selection by
the medial striatum. J. Neurosci. 29, 3148–3159.
Koval, M.J., Hutchison, R.M., Lomber, S.G., and Everling, S. (2014). Effects of
unilateral deactivations of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate
cortex on saccadic eye movements. J. Neurophysiol. 111, 787–803.
Krupa, D.J., Ghazanfar, A.A., and Nicolelis, M.A.L. (1999). Immediate thalamic
sensory plasticity depends on corticothalamic feedback. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci.
USA 96, 8200–8205.
Leenaars, C.H., Joosten, R.N., Zwart, A., Sandberg, H., Ruimschotel, E.,
Hanegraaf, M.A., Dematteis, M., Feenstra, M.G., and van Someren, E.J.
(2012). Switch-task performance in rats is disturbed by 12 h of sleep depriva-
tion but not by 12 h of sleep fragmentation. Sleep 35, 211–221.
Lomber, S.G., Payne, B.R., and Cornwell, P. (2001). Role of the superior colli-
culus in analyses of space: superficial and intermediate layer contributions to
visual orienting, auditory orienting, and visuospatial discriminations during uni-
lateral and bilateral deactivations. J. Comp. Neurol. 441, 44–57.
Lund, R.D., Land, P.W., and Boles, J. (1980). Normal and abnormal uncrossed
retinotectal pathways in rats: an HRP study in adults. J. Comp. Neurol. 189,
711–720.
Marquis, J.-P., Killcross, S., and Haddon, J.E. (2007). Inactivation of the pre-
limbic, but not infralimbic, prefrontal cortex impairs the contextual control of
response conflict in rats. Eur. J. Neurosci. 25, 559–566.
Martin, J.H. (1991). Autoradiographic estimation of the extent of reversible
inactivation produced by microinjection of lidocaine and muscimol in the rat.
Neurosci. Lett. 127, 160–164.
May, P.J. (2006). The mammalian superior colliculus: laminar structure and
connections. Prog. Brain Res. 151, 321–378.
McDowell, J.E., Dyckman, K.A., Austin, B.P., and Clementz, B.A. (2008).
Neurophysiology and neuroanatomy of reflexive and volitional saccades: evi-
dence from studies of humans. Brain Cogn. 68, 255–270.
McPeek, R.M., and Keller, E.L. (2004). Deficits in saccade target selection after
inactivation of superior colliculus. Nat. Neurosci. 7, 757–763.
Miller, E.K., and Cohen, J.D. (2001). An integrative theory of prefrontal cortex
function. Annu. Rev. Neurosci. 24, 167–202.
Monsell, S. (2003). Task switching. Trends Cogn. Sci. 7, 134–140.
Monsell, S., Yeung, N., and Azuma, R. (2000). Reconfiguration of task-set: is it
easier to switch to the weaker task? Psychol. Res. 63, 250–264.
Munoz, D.P., and Everling, S. (2004). Look away: the anti-saccade task and the
voluntary control of eye movement. Nat. Rev. Neurosci. 5, 218–228.
Narayanan, N.S., and Laubach, M. (2006). Top-down control of motor cortex
ensembles by dorsomedial prefrontal cortex. Neuron 52, 921–931.
Narayanan, N.S., Horst, N.K., and Laubach, M. (2006). Reversible inactivations
of rat medial prefrontal cortex impair the ability to wait for a stimulus.
Neuroscience 139, 865–876.
Oualian, C., and Gisquet-Verrier, P. (2010). The differential involvement of the
prelimbic and infralimbic cortices in response conflict affects behavioral flex-
ibility in rats trained in a new automated strategy-switching task. Learn. Mem.
17, 654–668.
Pierrot-Deseilligny, C., Rivaud, S., Gaymard, B., and Agid, Y. (1991). Cortical
control of reflexive visually-guided saccades. Brain 114, 1473–1485.
Ragozzino, M.E., Detrick, S., and Kesner, R.P. (1999). Involvement of the pre-
limbic-infralimbic areas of the rodent prefrontal cortex in behavioral flexibility
for place and response learning. J. Neurosci. 19, 4585–4594.
Rich, E.L., and Shapiro, M.L. (2007). Prelimbic/infralimbic inactivation impairs
memory for multiple task switches, but not flexible selection of familiar tasks.
J. Neurosci. 27, 4747–4755.
Rich, E.L., and Shapiro, M. (2009). Rat prefrontal cortical neurons selectively
code strategy switches. J. Neurosci. 29, 7208–7219.
Rodgers, C.C., and DeWeese, M.R. (2014). Neural correlates of task switching
in prefrontal cortex and primary auditory cortex in a novel stimulus selection
task for rodents. Neuron 82, 1157–1170.
Rogers, R.D., and Monsell, S. (1995). Costs of a predictable switch between
simple cognitive tasks. J. Exp. Psychol. Gen. 124, 207–231.
Schiller, P.H., True, S.D., and Conway, J.L. (1979). Effects of frontal eye field
and superior colliculus ablations on eye movements. Science 206, 590–592.Seamans, J.K., Floresco, S.B., and Phillips, A.G. (1995). Functional differences
between the prelimbic and anterior cingulate regions of the rat prefrontal cor-
tex. Behav. Neurosci. 109, 1063–1073.
Sinnamon, H.M., and Garcia, E.J. (1988). Lateral neglect in a head movement
task: more impairment with unilateral than bilateral lesions of the superior col-
liculus in the rat. Behav. Brain Res. 27, 131–143.
Sparks, D.L. (1999). Conceptual issues related to the role of the superior colli-
culus in the control of gaze. Curr. Opin. Neurobiol. 9, 698–707.
Sparks, D.L., and Hartwich-Young, R. (1989). The deep layers of the superior
colliculus. Rev. Oculomot. Res. 3, 213–255.
Sprague, J.M., andMeikle, T.H., Jr. (1965). The role of the superior colliculus in
visually guided behavior. Exp. Neurol. 11, 115–146.
Stoet, G., and Snyder, L.H. (2009). Neural correlates of executive control func-
tions in the monkey. Trends Cogn. Sci. 13, 228–234.
Vandierendonck, A., Liefooghe, B., and Verbruggen, F. (2010). Task switching:
interplay of reconfiguration and interference control. Psychol. Bull. 136,
601–626.
Wegener, S.P., Johnston, K., and Everling, S. (2008). Microstimulation of mon-
key dorsolateral prefrontal cortex impairs antisaccade performance. Exp.
Brain Res. 190, 463–473.
Weiler, J., and Heath, M. (2012). Task-switching in oculomotor control: unidi-
rectional switch-cost when alternating between pro- and antisaccades.
Neurosci. Lett. 530, 150–154.
Wylie, G., and Allport, A. (2000). Task switching and the measurement of
‘‘switch costs.’’ Psychol. Res. 63, 212–233.
Yeung, N., and Monsell, S. (2003). Switching between tasks of unequal famil-
iarity: the role of stimulus-attribute and response-set selection. J. Exp.
Psychol. Hum. Percept. Perform. 29, 455–469.
Yeung, S., Rubino, C., Viswanathan, J., and Barton, J.J.S. (2014). The inter-
trial effect of prepared but not executed antisaccades. Exp. Brain Res. 232,
3699–3705.
Ze´non, A., and Krauzlis, R.J. (2012). Attention deficits without cortical neuronal
deficits. Nature 489, 434–437.Neuron 86, 1491–1503, June 17, 2015 ª2015 Elsevier Inc. 1503
